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Abstract. Bumb and Hoede have shown that a cooperative game can be
split into two games, the reward game and the fine game, by considering
the sign of quantities cvS in the c-diagram of the game. One can then
define a solution x for the original game as x = xr − xf , where xr is
a solution for the reward game and xf is a solution for the fine game.
Due to the distinction of cooperation rewards and fines, for allocating
the fines one may use another solution concept than for the rewards.
In this paper, a fine vector is introduced and a solution is defined by fine
vectors. The structure and properties of this solution are studied. And
the solution is characterized as the unique solution having efficiency and
f−potential property (resp. f−balanced contributions property).
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1 Introduction and fine game
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU) is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N is
a nonempty, finite set and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function, defined on
the power set of N , satisfying v(∅) = 0. An element of N (notation: i ∈ N) and
a nonempty subset S of N (notation: S ⊆ N or S ∈ 2N with S 6= ∅) are called a
player and coalition respectively, and the associated real number v(S) is called
the worth of coalition S. The size of coalition S is denoted by s. Particularly, n
denotes the size of the player set N . For a cooperative game 〈N, v〉 and R ⊆ N ,
the subgame 〈R, v〉 is defined by vR(S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ R. We denote by
G the universal game space consisting of all these TU-games. A game is called
inessential if v(S) =
∑
i∈S v(i) for any S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅.
A solution vector of an n-person TU-game is an n-dimensional vector giving
a payoff to any player i ∈ N . A solution function is a function x that assigns a
solution vector x(v) ∈ Rn to any game 〈N, v〉. A solution function x is efficient
if for any game the total payoff it assigns to the players is equal to the worth
? Supported by NSFC grant No. 70571065
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v(N) of the grand coalition, i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi(v) = v(N) for any n-players game
〈N, v〉. Most of the proposed solution concepts meet the individual rationality
principle which requires xi(v) ≥ v(i). An example of an efficient solution function
is the Shapley value, and the value meets the individual rationality principle (see
Shapley [11]), being the weighted average of so-called marginal value vectors. A
solution mapping is a mapping ψ that assigns to every game 〈N, v〉 a set of
solution vectors in Rn.
Given the player set N , with every subset S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅, there is associated
its unanimity game 〈N, uS〉 defined by uS(T ) =
{
1, if S ⊆ T ;
0, otherwise. From the theory
of cooperative games, one knows that any cooperative game 〈N, v〉 can be rep-
resented as a linear combination of the characteristic functions of the unanimity
games. To be exact, it is well-known that
v =
∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
cvS · uS , where cvS =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)s−tv(T ) for all S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅.
By this expression, it is easy to check the following property.
Proposition 1 For a cooperative game 〈N, v〉, each subgame 〈R, v〉 has the same
cvS as the initial game 〈N, v〉 for any S ⊆ R.
The quantities cvS are widely used in the theory of cooperative games. Recall
that one of the classical proofs for the Shapley value satisfying four axioms,
namely efficiency, anonymity, dummy player and additivity is done by using the
above expression (see [11]). And, Harsanyi defined c
v
S
s as dividends (see [6], [7]).
Based on the definition, the solution set named Harsanyi set and related concepts
have been introduced independently by Vasil’ev [13], [14], [15] and [16], and by
Hammer, Peled and Sorensen [5]. Recently this set of solutions has been discussed
by Derks, Haller and Peters [3] as the so-called selectope. The quantities cvS also
proved to be essential in establishing the connection between set games and
cooperative games (see [1]).
Here, let us recall several results already stated in the papers of Bumb and
Hoede (see [2]). They used the Hasse diagram to indicate the values of the
coalitions in the cooperative game as well as the associated numbers cvS , see
Figure 1 (Note that we have written cS for cvS).
v123
v12 v13 v23
v1 v2 v3
0
c123
c12 c13 c23
c1 c2 c3
0
Figure 1: v-diagram and c-diagram of a 3-players cooperative game
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Note that the sum of the numbers cS equals v123. Restriction of the c-diagram
to subsets of a coalition S determines a sub-c-diagram with numbers that sum
up to vS , i.e. v(S) =
∑
T⊆S
cS . For example, c13 + c1 + c3 = v13.
Example 1 Consider the following 3-players game.
5
3 3 3
1 2 3
0
2
0 -1 -2
1 2 3
0
v: c:=⇒
The cvS can be interpreted as a cooperation bonus or reward in case c
v
S ≥ 0
or as a cooperation malus or fine in case the inequality is in the other direction.
Bumb and Hoede separated the c-diagram into two c-diagrams, one only having
nonnegative numbers and another only having nonpositive numbers in the dia-
grams. As a c-diagram determines a v-diagram, i.e., a game, it means that in
a natural way one can split the game into two games; the reward game and the
fine game now.
For Example 1, we can split the c-diagram into two c-diagrams cr and cf .
2
0 0 0
1 2 3
0
0
0 1 2
0 0 0
0
cr: −cf :
and the reward game and the fine game are
8
3 4 5
1 2 3
0
3
0 1 2
0 0 0
0
vr: vf :
where the minus signs have been omitted.
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So when we discuss the fine game and its solution concept, both vf (S) and
c
vf
S should be considered to be nonnegative numbers.
A game 〈N, v〉 is convex if v(S)+v(T ) ≤ v(S∪T )+v(S∩T ) for all S, T ⊆ N .
By splitting a game v into a reward game vr and a fine game vf , both with c-
diagrams containing non-negative numbers we have
Theorem 2 The reward game vr and the fine game vf are convex games.
Proof: We only prove this for the fine game, a similar proof can be given for
the reward game. For all S, T ⊆ N , let Q = S ∩ T .
vf (S) + vf (T ) =
∑
R⊆S
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆T
c
vf
R
=
∑
R⊆S\Q
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆Q
c
vf
R +
∑
Q⊂R⊂S
c
vf
R +
∑
S\Q⊂R⊆S
c
vf
R
+
∑
R⊆T\Q
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆Q
c
vf
R +
∑
Q⊂R⊂T
c
vf
R +
∑
T\Q⊂R⊆T
c
vf
R
≤
∑
R⊆S\Q
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆Q
c
vf
R +
∑
Q⊂R⊂S
c
vf
R +
∑
S\Q⊂R⊆S
c
vf
R
+
∑
R⊆T\Q
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆Q
c
vf
R +
∑
Q⊂R⊂T
c
vf
R +
∑
T\Q⊂R⊆T
c
vf
R
+
∑
S⊂R⊂S∪T
c
vf
R +
∑
T⊂R⊆S∪T
c
vf
R
=
∑
R⊆(S\Q)∪(T\Q)∪Q
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆Q
c
vf
R
=
∑
R⊆S∪T
c
vf
R +
∑
R⊆S∩T
c
vf
R
= vf (S ∪ T ) + vf (S ∩ T ).
Theorem 2 shows that any game 〈N, v〉 can be split into two convex games,
the reward game and the fine game. Being a convex game is important in game
theory because of its good properties. Let xr be a solution for the reward game
and let xf be a solution for the fine game. One can then allocate for the original
game x = xr − xf . Designing a solution concept may be seen as deciding on
how the cooperation rewards and cooperation fines should be allocated. The fair
way to split a cooperation reward for some coalition, seems to split the reward
into equal parts and allocate them to each of the members of the coalition. This
would mean using the Shapley value for the reward game. Due to the distinction
of cooperation rewards and fines, in fact for allocating the fines one may use
another solution concept than for the rewards.
In this paper, we concentrate on solutions and their properties for fine games.
In Section 2 fine vectors are introduced and a solution for fine games with respect
to a give fine vector is defined. We discuss the structure and properties of this
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solution and show how the solution set is related to the Shapley value. In Sec-
tion 3 we define two properties named f−potential property and f−balanced
contributions property with respect to a given fine vector f and characterize
the solution as the unique solution verifying efficiency and f−potential property
(resp. f−balanced contributions property).
2 A solution defined by fine vectors
There are many solution concepts proposed in the literature of cooperative
games. All of them are given in different ways for sharing the worth of all coali-
tions v(T ), T ⊆ N . In terms of the cvS ’s a solution concept may be a rather
complex expression. However, any efficient solution distributes v(N) over the n
players. As v(N) =
∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
cvS any such solution can be written as
xi =
∑
S⊆N
λS,ic
v
S . (1)
This simply expresses that in games every player i gets a certain share of each
cvS .
In case λS,i = 1n , for each S and i, every player gets the same, namely
v(N)
n .
This allocation is called the egalitarian value. But if only for player 1 we have
λS,1 = 1 while λS,i = 0 for all i, i 6= 1, the allocation can be called the unfair
value. In this paper we show that the well-known Shapley value is a solution
concept where the allocation is according to λS,i = 1s , for all i ∈ S, and the
allocation has an extremely simple expression in terms of the cvS . Solutions may
therefore be studied or classified by considering the possibilities for λS,i.
The members of the coalitions with negative cvS should assume responsibility
for the fines. For allocating the fines or for deciding on the λS,i, a fine vector
fN = (f1, f2, · · · , fn) such that fi > 0, i = 1, 2, · · ·n is introduced to describe
the weight of responsibility for the fines. We denote the set of all possible fine
vectors as Fn = {fN}. Given the set Fn of fine vectors, a solution Φ : G → Rn
for fine games is defined as follows.
Definition 1 For any game 〈N, v〉, we define a solution φf := Φ(v) with respect
to a given fine vector f ∈ Fn as
φfi =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS ,
where
f(S) =
∑
i∈S
fi, and cvS =
∑
T⊆S,T 6=∅
(−1)s−tv(T ).
The next theorem presents an alternative characterization of this solution in
terms of marginal contributions.
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Theorem 3 For any game 〈N, v〉, the solution φf with respect to a given fine
vector f ∈ Fn can be expressed by marginal contributions as
φfi =
∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi · fT
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)], where fT = ∑
S|S⊇T
(−1)s−t
f(S)
.
Proof:
φfi =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
( fi
f(S)
∑
T⊆S
(−1)s−tv(T )
)
=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
( ∑
T⊆S,T3i
(−1)s−tv(T ) +
∑
T⊂S,T 63i
(−1)s−tv(T )
)
=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
[ ∑
T⊆S,T3i
(
(−1)s−tv(T ) + (−1)s−t−1v(T \ i)
)]
=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
[ ∑
T⊆S,T3i
(−1)s−t[v(T )− v(T \ i)]]
=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
( ∑
T⊆S,T3i
(−1)s−t[v(T )− v(T \ i)])
∗=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)](fi · ∑
S|S⊇T
(−1)s−t
f(S)
)
=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi · fT
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)].
The equality (∗) holds because v(T )− v(T \ i) must be included by all coalitions
S (S ⊇ T ) and appears as fi · (−1)
s−t
f(S)
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)].
Proposition 4 Let fN = (f1, f2, · · · , fn) be a fine vector. Then for all i ∈ N ,∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi · fT = 1.
Proof: For any player i ∈ N , we have
∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi · fT =
∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi
∑
S⊇T
(−1)s−t
f(S)
.
Fix coalition S and choose T ⊆ N. The number of coalitions T for which
i ∈ T ⊆ S, so 1 ≤ t ≤ s, is (s−1t−1). Therefore
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∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi · fT =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
s∑
t=1
(−1)s−t
(
s− 1
t− 1
)
k=t−1 ∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
s−1∑
k=0
(−1)s−k−1
(
s− 1
k
)
1k
=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
(
(−1) + 1
)s−1
.
For s ≥ 2 the contribution is 0. For s = 1, f(S) = fi and the contribution is 1,
as follows directly from the first expression.
By Proposition 4, for an inessential game, we have φfi =
[
v(T ) − v(T \
i)
]
= v(i). It shows that the solution has the inessential game property. For
f = (1, 1, · · · , 1), Definition 1 gives φfi =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
1
s c
v
S , which is the Shapley
value. The more familiar expression for this value is confirmed by the following
Proposition.
Proposition 5 If f = (1, 1, · · · , 1), then fi · fT = (t−1)!(n−t)!n! .
Proof:
fi · fT =
∑
S|S⊇T
(−1)s−t fi
f(S)
=
∑
S|S⊇T
(−1)s−t 1
s
=
n∑
s=t
(−1)s−t 1
s
(
n− t
s− t
)
k=s−t
n−t∑
k=0
(−1)k 1
k + t
(
n− t
k
)
=
n−t∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
n− t
k
)∫ 1
0
xk+t−1dx
=
∫ 1
0
n−t∑
k=0
(−1)kxk+t−1
(
n− t
k
)
dx
=
∫ 1
0
xt−1
n−t∑
k=0
(−x)k
(
n− t
k
)
1n−t−kdx
=
∫ 1
0
xt−1(1− x)n−tdx.
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Let f ′ = (1−x)n−t, g = xt−1, and use ∫ f ′g = fg−∫ fg′, repeatedly. This leads
to
fi · fT = − 1
n− t+ 1(1− x)
n−t+1xt−1
∣∣∣1
0
−
∫ 1
0
−1
n− t+ 1(1− x)
n−t+1dxt−1
=
t− 1
n− t+ 1
∫ 1
0
(1− x)n−t+1(x)t−2dx
= · · ·
=
(t− 1)(t− 2) · · · 1
(n− t+ 1)(n− t+ 2) · · · (n− 1) ·
∫ 1
0
(1− x)n−1(x)0dx
=
(t− 1)!
(n− t+ 1)(n− t+ 2) · · · (n− 1) ·
∫ 1
0
−(1− x)n−1d(1− x)
=
(t− 1)!
(n− t+ 1)(n− t+ 2) · · · (n− 1)n · −(1− x)
n
∣∣∣1
0
=
(t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
Choosing a reasonable fine vector means a good solution for a fine game.
How to choose the fine vector is very important for the solution mapping Φ.
For example, we can choose the number of times player i belongs to an S with
negative cvS . This determines a vector a = (a1, a2, · · · , an) and if a =
∑n
i=1 ai, fi
could be taken to be aia .
Following Example 1, the Shapley value of the reward game is xr = ( 53 ,
8
3 ,
11
3 ).
We choose the frequency based vector a as fine vector , i.e., f = ( 14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2 ), so the
solution for the fine game is xf = ( 13 ,
2
3 , 2). The solution of the original game is
then x = xr − xf = ( 43 , 2, 53 ).
The Shapley value for the cf -diagram is ( 12 , 1,
3
2 ) and the Shapley value for
the original game is therewith (76 ,
5
3 ,
13
6 ). We see that the fining procedure gives
a punishment to player 3, whose allocation goes from 136 to
5
3 . His loss
1
2 goes to
player 1 : 16 and player 2 :
1
3 .
For a game in which a cost is to be shared, the c-diagram can be split into
two diagrams again, but the interpretation is then changing. The positive cS ’s
are now costs, resulting from joint activities, whereas the negative cS ’s can be
seen as savings on the costs, due to cooperation. The names cost game and
saving game are proposed. A Cost and Saving method exchanges the ways of
dealing with the two games, now the Shapley value seems fair for the saving
game, whereas the method used for the fine game might be chosen for the cost
game. After all, rewards and savings are typically cooperation bonuses, whereas
fines and costs are cooperation maluses.
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3 f−potential and f−balanced contributions
A potential for a solution ψ on G, is a function P defined on G, such that for all
games 〈N, v〉 in G we have
P (N, v)− P (N \ {i}, v) = ψi(N, v), for all i ∈ N.
We say that a solution ψ on G has the P−property if ψ has a potential.
Hart and Mas Colell have shown in [8] that the Shapley value is characterized
by the P−property and efficiency. Further, they obtained the potential of the
Shapley value and many other important results, including the fact shown in
[10] that the Shapley value is also characterized by the balanced contributions
property and efficiency. Here, a value ψ on G has the balanced contributions
property (BC-property), if we have for any game 〈N, v〉 and for all pairs i, j ∈ N ,
ψi(N, v)− ψi(N \ {j}, v) = ψj(N, v)− ψj(N \ {i}, v).
Now, we introduce the f−potential and f−balanced contributions into our
current framework.
Definition 2 Let ψ be a solution on G and fN = (f1, f2, · · · , fn) be a fine
vector.
1. The solution admits an f−potential if there exists a function P f : G → R
with respect to the fine vector f satisfying
ψi(N, v) = fi
[
P f (N, v)− P f (N \ {i}, v)], for all i ∈ N.
2. The solution has the f−balanced contributions property with respect to the
fine vector f , if for any game 〈N, v〉 and for all pairs i, j ∈ N , it holds that
ψi(N, v)− ψi(N \ {j}, v)
fi
=
ψj(N, v)− ψj(N \ {i}, v)
fj
.
The following result presents the relationship between two above properties
for a solution ψ on G.
Proposition 6 Any solution ψ that admits an f−potential function, satisfies
f−balanced contributions property.
Proof: By Definition 2, for any pair of players i, j ∈ N , we have
ψi(N, v)− ψi(N \ {j}, v)
fi
= P f (N, v)−P f (N\{i}, v)−P f (N\{j}, v)+P f (N\{i, j}, v).
The f−balanced contributions property is deduced directly from the symmetry
of i and j in this formula.
In terms of of f−potential property, we do axiomatization for the solution
as follows.
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Theorem 7 Let fN = (f1, f2, · · · , fn) be a fine vector.
1. Any efficient solution ψ : GN → RN admits a unique f−potential function
P f : G → R with respect to the fine vector f given by
P f (N, v) =
∑
S⊆N
cvS
f(S)
or, equivalently, P f (N, v) =
∑
T⊆N
fT · v(T ).
2. The efficient solution ψ that admits an f−potential function with respect to
the fine vector f , is of the following form
ψi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS or, ψi(N, v) =
∑
T⊆N,T3i
fi · fT
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)].
Proof: Suppose the efficient solution ψ : GN → RN admits an f−potential
function P f : G → R such that for all games 〈N, v〉 hold
ψi(N, v) = fi
[
P f (N, v)− P f (N \ {i}, v)], for all i ∈ N.
Summing up over all i ∈ N yields
v(N) =
∑
i∈N
ψi(N, v) = f(N) · P f (N, v)−
∑
i∈N
fi · P f (N \ {i}, v)
and hence
P f (N, v) =
1
f(N)
[
v(N) +
∑
i∈N
fi · P f (N \ {i}, v)
]
,
where P f (∅, v) = 0. This recursive formula determines the f−potential function
P f uniquely. We check the validity of the f−potential P f (N, v) = ∑
S⊆N
cvS
f(S) .
For any game 〈N, v〉,∑
i∈N
fi·P f (N\{i}, v) =
∑
i∈N
fi·
∑
S⊆N\{i}
cvS
f(S)
=
∑
S(N
[ ∑
i∈N\S
fi
] cvS
f(S)
=
∑
S(N
f(N \ S)
f(S)
cvS .
Recall that the dividends of a subgame are identical to those of the initial game.
Hence,
v(N) +
∑
i∈N
fi · P f (N \ {i}, v) =
∑
S⊆N
cvS +
∑
S(N
f(N \ S)
f(S)
cvS
= cvN +
∑
S(N
(
1 +
f(N \ S)
f(S)
)
cvS = c
v
N +
∑
S(N
f(N)
f(S)
cvS
=
∑
S⊆N
f(N)
f(S)
cvS = P
f (N, v).
The alternative formula for the f−potential follows from Theorem 3.
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Notice that by the obtained f−potential formula, it holds that
P f (N, v)− P f (N \ {i}, v) =
∑
S⊆N
cvS
f(S)
−
∑
S⊆N\{i}
cvS
f(S)
=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
cvS
f(S)
.
By Definition 1 and 2, together with Theorem 3, conclusion (2) holds.
Moreover, we have the next characterization theorem of this solution.
Theorem 8 The following statements are equivalent for any efficient solution
ψ on GN .
1. ψ is of the form ψi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
fi
f(S)c
v
S.
2. ψ admits an f−potential function P f : G → R such that ψ = f · OP .
3. ψ has the f−balanced contributions property.
Proof: By Theorem 7, conclusion (1) and conclusion (2) are equivalent. And
conclusion (3) follows directly from conclusion (2) Proposition 6. It is left to the
reader to show that conclusion (3) implies conclusion (1) for any efficient value.
We use induction on n to prove this.
For any two-person game, its efficient solution ψ having the f−balanced
contributions property means that
ψ1({12}, v)− v(1)
f1
=
ψ2({12}, v)− v(2)
f2
, and ψ1({12}, v)+ψ2({12}, v) = v(12).
So we have ψi({12}, v) = fif(12)cv12 + cvi =
∑
S⊆{12},S3i
fi
f(S)c
v
S , i = 1, 2.
Now suppose ψi({T}, v) =
∑
S⊆{T},S3i
fi
f(S)c
v
S is true for all games 〈T, v〉 such
that t ≤ n − 1. For any game 〈N, v〉 ∈ GN and i, j ∈ N , by the f−balanced
contributions property we have
ψi(N, v)
fi
− ψj(N, v)
fj
=
ψi(N \ {j}, v)
fi
− ψj(N \ {i}, v)
fj
.
And we have
fj
fi
ψi(N, v)− ψj(N, v) = fj
fi
ψi(N \ {j}, v)− ψj(N \ {i}, v).
By the efficiency property, summing up over all j ∈ N, j 6= i yields∑
j 6=i
fj
fi
ψi(N, v)−
(
v(N)− ψi(N, v)
)
=
∑
j 6=i
fj
fi
ψi(N \ {j}, v)−
∑
j 6=i
ψj(N \ {i}, v).
That is
ψi(N, v)
fi
(∑
j 6=i
fj + fi
)
= v(N) +
∑
j 6=i
fj
fi
ψi(N \ {j}, v)− v(N \ {i}).
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By the induction hypothesis on subgames 〈N \ {j}, v〉, we obtain
ψi(N, v)
fi
f(N) = v(N)− v(N \ {i}) +
∑
j 6=i
fj
fi
∑
S⊆N\{j},S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS .
Hence
ψi(N, v)
fi
=
1
f(N)
[
v(N)− v(N \ {i}) +
∑
j 6=i
fj
fi
∑
S⊆N\{j},S3i
fi
f(S)
cvS
]
=
1
f(N)
[ ∑
S⊆N,S3i
cvS +
∑
j 6=i
∑
S⊆N\{j},S3i
fj
f(S)
cvS
]
∗=
1
f(N)
[ ∑
S⊆N,S3i
cvS +
∑
S⊆N,S3i
f(N \ S)
f(S)
cvS
]
=
1
f(N)
∑
S⊆N,S3i
f(N)
f(S)
cvS =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
1
f(S)
cvS .
The equality (∗) holds because in double summings the item 1f(S)cvS with respect
to S always appears as fjf(S)c
v
S according to S ⊆ N \ {j} for all possible j /∈ S.
This completes the proof.
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